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I. SUBJECTS AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION
A. Inheritance Taxes
Inz re Hutchins' Estate1 determined the inheritance tax liability result-
ing from a voluntary irrevocable trust indenture which was executed in
1930 and provided that the trust income should be paid to the grantor for
life and that on her death certain portions of the corpus should be paid to
named beneficiaries and other portions should be continued in trust with
the income from such reduced corpus to be paid to other named beneficiaries.
After the grantor's death in 1953, the beneficiaries of the trust were held
to have taken in "enjoyment" at or after the death of the grantor, who
was held to have retained the enjoyment of her property for and during
her life. Therefore, the trust assets were held subject to inheritance tax under
applicable Section 570, Missouri Revised Statutes (1929), imposing such
tax on transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the death of the transferor.
B. Sales or Use Tax
Where a parent corporation acquires motor vehicles through the merger
of wholly owned subsidiary companies into the parent corporation, such
acquisition does not constitute a transfer subject to sales or use tax.2 The
statutes imposing a two per cent tax on the purchase price of vehicles pur-
chased or acquired for use on Missouri highways implies, by the use of the
words "purchase price," a sale or contract of exchange. When corporations
merge, the transfer of property is by operation of law and not by contract of
sale or exchange. Therefore, no purchase price is involved, and such trans-
fer is not taxable.
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1959 and 1960 Missouri court
decisions.
**Attorney, Springfield, Missouri; A.B., University of Missouri, 1948, LL.B.,
1950.
1. 323 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. 1959).
2. National Dairy Products Corp. v. Carpenter, 326 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1959).
3. § 144.440, RSMo 1957 Supp.
(398)
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C. License or Privilege Tax
In State v. City of Springfield,4 the city was held liable under Section
142.371, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), for an excise tax of three cents
per gallon on propane gas used in its buses. The city unsuccessfully con-
tended that such tax was on the use of such special fuels as propane gas
and, therefore, constituted a use tax which the legislature was prohibited
by the constitution 5 from imposing on the city. With three judges dissent-
ing, the court en banc held that the tax is essentially a privilege or license
tax imposed on the use of the highways rather than on the use of the fuel.
Use of the fuel is important only in the sense that the number of gallons
of propane used furnishes the standard for determining the amount of the
tax due for highway use.
In Transport Rentals, Iw. v. Carpenter,6 motor vehicles operated with-
in Missouri by a nonresident lessee having no right under the lease to pur-
chase the vehicles were held to fall within the applicable Missouri reciprocity
statutory provisions7 and did not have to be registered in Missouri if they
were registered in the state of their owner's residence and that state granted
like exemptions to motor vehicles registered under the laws of, and owned
by residents of, Missouri. It was held immaterial whether such motor ve-
hicles were registered in the state of which such operator was a resident
or whether that state granted like exemptions to motor vehicles of Missouri
residents. The owner, as defined by the Missouri reciprocity provisions, and
not the operator as such must be considered as the person or corporation
seeking reciprocity.
II. ASSESSMENT OF TAXES
Plaintiff's right to appeal to the State Tax Commission from his tax as-
sessment was at issue in Drey v. State Tax Comm'n.s The records of the
county board of equalization were completely silent on the question of wheth-
er or not plaintiff had appealed to the county board from his assessment, and
4. 332 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
5. Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 39 provides that "The general assembly shall not
have power: ... (10) To impose a use or sales tax upon the use, purchase or acquisi-
tion of property paid for out of the funds of any county or other political subdivi-
sion."
6. 325 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959).
7. § 301.010(17, 19), RSMo 1957 Supp. and § 301.270, RSMo 1949.
8. 323 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1959).
1960]
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such records did not in any way reflect any consideration by the board of
plaintiff's assessment. The county clerk, as secretary of the county board of
equalization, is required by statute9 to keep an accurate record of the pro-
ceedings and orders of the board as to every assessment considered whether
or not any change is made therein, but the absence of an affirmative show-
ing by the records of the county board that plaintiff had appealed to it is
not conclusive and does not alone preclude plaintiff from appealing to the
Commission. A formal petition is not necessary to perfect an appeal to
the county boards of equalization; rather it is sufficient if taxpayers make
it known to such boards either in person, by attorney or agent, or in writ-
ing, that they are objecting to or protesting their assessments. 10 Evidence that
the county board knew plaintiff was objecting to his assessment, that plain-
tiff's attorney appeared before the board and discussed the assessment with
it, and that the board members then discussed the assessment and voted
on the question of changing it, was sufficient to constitute an appeal by
plaintiff to the county board so as to require the Commission to accept
jurisdiction of plaintiff's appeal to it.
In State ex rel. Wilson Ckevrolet, Inc. v. Wilson," the proceedings
of the county board of equalization increasing relators' merchants-tax val-
uation were held void. Such boards are created by statute and have only
such limited jurisdictionf and powers as are committed to them by statute.
They speak only through their records which must affirmatively show facts
vesting them with jurisdiction, or their actions and decisions must be held
void. Notice of the valuation increase being required by statute,'12 proof of
such notice was a jurisdictional fact which must affirmatively appear of
record. A copy of a letter addressed to relators was insufficient to show the
giving of the required notice in the absence of proof by affidavit, certificate
or recital somewhere in the board's proceedings that the original letter was
duly and timely mailed. Neither could the giving of notice be proved by
parol evidence extrinsic to the board's record. Section 536.105, Missouri
Revised Statutes (Supp. 1957), relied on by the board, is applicable to
non-contested cases which are not subject to administrative review but is
not applicable to decisions of county boards of equalization from which
there is a right of appeal to the State Tax Commission. Furthermore, the
9. § 138.060, RSMo 1949.
10. Mo. Laws 1945, at 1782, as amended, § 137.275, RSMo 1949.
11. 332 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1960).
12. § 150.060, RSMo 1957 Supp.
[Vol. 25
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court indicated that even in those cases where such statute is applicable,
the board may not use extrinsic evidence to establish a jurisdictional fact
required to be shown by the record but not appearing therein.
III. TAX SALES AND TITLES
Section 140.590, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), contains a special
three-year statute of limitations against attack on a collector's tax deed.
However, there has been imposed on such statute a judicial exception that
tax deeds void on their face do not start the statute running. Such judicial
exception was applied in Pettus v. City of St. Louis'3 in which the defend-
ant city had paid $4.75 for each of twenty parcels of land sold by the city
collector at a tax sale. While the deeds did not disclose the nature of the
parcels, their physical characteristics and surroundings, or whether they
were improved or not, they did disclose the size of the parcels and certain
ones were so described as to disclose their frontage and depth. The parcels
comprised six assembled tracts of land totaling forty-eight acres in one
locality of the city, and the total consideration paid by the city was $95.00.
More than three years after the tax deeds were recorded, plaintiffs brought
suit to quiet title, alleging that the deeds were void upon their face because
the consideration was so inadequate as to shock the court's conscience.
Noting that Costello v. City of St. Louis' 4 was the first and only decision
applying the void-on-its-face doctrine to consideration, the court compared
what it described as the controlling elements (quantity of land, front foot-
age, sale price per front foot, square footage, and sale price per square foot)
in the instant case and the Costello case. Concluding from such comparison
that the instant case was much more aggravated than the Costello case, the
court held the collector's tax deeds void on their face and, therefore, insuf-
ficient to set the special statute of limitations in motion.
The court, however, may have invited an effort to bring about a re-
consideration of the holding in the Costello case. Pointing out that defend-
ant city merely sought to distinguish the Costello case and did not contend
that its holding was wrong or should be overruled, the court commented
that it would be time enough to examine that question if and when it was
raised and briefed but that the case should be adhered to under the circum-
stances presented.
13. 328 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1959).
14. 262 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1953).
19601
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The court also posed the possibility that a tax sale to a governmental
unit to which taxes are due constitutes an extinguishment of such taxes
and thereby furnishes consideration for the sale which should be considered
in addition to the bid price on the issue of inadequacy of consideration.
Such issue not being raised, the court did not choose to consider it further.
The defendant city also claimed title to certain portions of the property
by virtue of two sheriff's deeds made pursuant to a sale under special
execution for benefits assessed against such portions in a condemnation
proceeding. The sheriff's deeds were held invalid for inadequacy of con-
sideration so gross as in itself to constitute fraud. Not being restricted to
the face of the sheriff's deeds since no question of limitations was raised as
to those deeds, the court found from the evidence that the consideration in
each of the sheriff's deeds was only about two per cent of the true value of
the land.
In Euans v. Brassel,15 the superiority of a general real estate tax lien
as against a lien of special taxes for improvements was upheld. Plaintiff had
purchased certain property at a sheriff's sale held pursuant to a special
execution issued upon a benefit judgment previously entered in a condemna-
tion suit. At that time, general taxes assessed against the property in the
names of the former owners were delinquent. The property was thereafter
sold for delinquent taxes by the collector to defendant City of St. Louis.
The sheriff's deed to plaintiff did not wipe out the then existing general
taxes. Whatever title plaintiff acquired was subject to, and lost by the
foreclosure of, the lien for general taxes.
IV. USE OF FuNDs RAISED DY TAXATION
School crossing guards employed by the Board of Police Commissioners
of St. Louis to escort children safely across streets were engaged in either
a police function or a purely local function. If they were engaged in a police
function, they were improperly employed because they increased the police
force above the strength authorized by the St. Louis Police Act.10 However,
if they were engaged in a local function, the State cannot tax for the per-
formance of local functions,17 and its agency, the Police Board, cannot use
15. 330 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
16. §§ 84.010-.340, RSMo 1949 and §§ 84.100-.265 1957 Supp.
17. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 10(a).
[Vol. 25
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tax funds for such functions. In either case, the city of St. Louis could not
be required to pay the salaries of such guards.' 8
V. MISCELLANEOUS
The St. Louis Police Act' 9 is not unconstitutional as a delegation of
the legislative power to tax without appropriate guidance or standards. Such
statutes contain sufficient limitations and standards governing the exercise
of the police board's discretion in matters of administrative detail that the
powers conferred are within the permissible limits of delegated discretion.20
18. State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn, 326 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
19. See statutes cited note 16 supra.
20. State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn, supra note 18.
1960]
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